Liverpool's transfer policy can be frustrating, risky and courageous all at once. They remain adept at competing at the top of the Premier League while lingering at the lower end of the 'net spend' table. Another transfer window is closing with Liverpool one of the most inactive clubs. It is deja vu for those wondering if the squad is equipped to compete on four fronts.
Liverpool won the Premier League in 2020 without making any major signings the previous summer. Arne Slot might repeat that. He has added only one player, Federico Chiesa, who has barely featured. Slot confirmed this week the club is looking to the next pre-season before buying anyone else.
The lack of recruitment since the new manager joined worries me. Liverpool would be stronger with a left-sided defender and an extra central midfielder. On current form, Slot's starting XI is capable of winning the Premier League and Champions League, but an injury to Virgil van Dijk or Mohamed Salah would be a big problem, and if Ryan Gravenberch is absent the club has no natural replacement as a No 6.
Liverpool were prepared to spend £51.5 million for Martín Zubimendi six months ago, recognising they needed more strength in depth. Gravenberch was the internal solution. Spending a little more in January to bring a deal for a long-term target forward would be a preferable insurance policy. Given the funds are there it feels like a gamble to wait rather than grasp the nettle right now.
That decision will be vindicated if Liverpool become champions. If they fall just short again, particularly to Arsenal, valid questions will be asked as to whether the club could and should have done more when in such a strong position. My biggest worry is what might happen against elite opponents in a Champions League semi-final or final if an obvious weakness is exposed. Liverpool know from bitter experience that flaws come to the surface in defining games.
Until we know the outcome of this campaign, it is fair to feel conflicted. That's where I stand, although I would argue the club has earned trust given how often they have got the big calls right. There is always a clear separation between the feelings of the majority and the most vocal social media critics, who are generally the loudest but are not a true representation.
Go online and you will read wild accusations of FSG of being tight with funds, first under Jürgen Klopp and now Slot. They will cite the hesitation to give Salah, Van Dijk and Trent Alexander-Arnold the new contracts they want, and well-established readiness to play the long game on recruitment. Sporting director Richard Hughes and FSG chief executive Michael Edwards have come under fire for not getting enough deals across the line.
To put it mildly, the argument that FSG are a hindrance rather than help is not compelling. Actually, it is a bit ridiculous. If Slot and Hughes had identified the right player last summer or in January, they would have been backed. It was Slot quoted saying 'Zubimendi or no-one'. It has never been Liverpool's way during any successful era to buy the wrong player for the sake of looking proactive.
Only two clubs - Manchester City and Real Madrid - stopped Klopp winning a couple more English and Champions League titles. When you fall short there is a sense of regret and a feeling that one more player could have been the difference. But everyone knows Liverpool do not have the capacity to outspend Real and City.
To suggest Liverpool do not invest or spend big when necessary is plain wrong. Last week's financial figures released by Deloitte showed Liverpool's wage bill for 2023-24 had risen £14 million to £387 million, underlining how much it increases after performance triggers and bonuses for winning a trophy and qualifying for the Champions League.
Those who helped win the Champions League in 2019 and Premier League in 2020 were handsomely rewarded with new, incentivised deals. I would never begrudge any player getting a pay rise, but in retrospect some of the salary increases in the aftermath of those successes were too big. It is unlikely to happen again on Edwards' watch.
Foundations for this season were laid over the last 18 months when Cody Gakpo, Dominik Szoboszlai, Alexis Mac Allister and Gravenberch were signed for in excess of £150 million in total. All have significantly improved under Slot. In any other business, such shrewdness and value for money in a high-performance industry is a cause for congratulations. Football is a curiosity as it is as likely to lead to recrimination.
It never used to be like this. In the 1970s, England's two outstanding young goalkeepers were Ray Clemence and Peter Shilton. Liverpool signed Clemence from Scunthorpe for £18,000 and sold him to Tottenham Hotspur for £300,000 after 14 years of service, shortly after Nottingham Forest paid £1 million for Shilton.
In 1977, when Liverpool sold Kevin Keegan to Hamburg for £500,000 and signed Kenny Dalglish from Celtic for £440,000, the phrase 'net spend' was not part of supporters' vocabulary. Being so clever in the market - replacing one legend with another and returning a £60,000 profit - was a badge of honour. No-one in the pubs of Anfield accused Liverpool's board of being more interested in profits, or lacking the ambition of big-spending rivals.
The modern application of the same ideas is why Edwards and Hughes have such a good reputation. The fixture of this weekend is Bournemouth versus Liverpool, not Arsenal versus Manchester City. Hughes earned the Liverpool job because of his work on the south coast. He was not hired from Bournemouth to run Liverpool like Chelsea or Manchester City. Expertise at identifying 'the next big thing' has long been the desire of well-run football clubs, and Bournemouth are among those who are exposing the recruitment and data shortcomings at wealthier rivals.
Hughes's Bournemouth appointment Andoni Iraola will be strongly linked with the vacancy at every major club for the foreseeable future, and the form of players such as Antoine Semenyo and Milos Kerkez suggests it is a matter of when, not if, they play in the Champions League. They might even do so with Bournemouth.
Headhunting Slot was another masterstroke by FSG. Identifying the right successor for Klopp was a defining moment in Liverpool's modern history, comparable to replacing Bill Shankly or Sir Kenny Dalglish, Manchester United moving on after the retirements of Sir Matt Busby and Sir Alex Ferguson, and Arsenal post-Arsene Wenger. We have seen many glorious eras grind to a halt when the figurehead left the building.
Time will tell if Liverpool's general inactivity in the transfer market across the last two windows is dangerous or clever. Given the small details make a big difference in sport, it could be both. If Liverpool win the title, Slot will be the hero. If it goes wrong from here, Edwards, Hughes and the rest of the FSG hierarchy will be cast by some as the villains.
That's how it works in football. Owners, executives and sporting directors are as unpopular as referees, thanked for nothing but blamed for everything.
Many directors in Edwards and Hughes' position could dine out for a while on making such a big call as replacing Klopp with Slot. Not at Liverpool.
But whatever the outcome in the title run-in, Liverpool can claim they have already made the signing of the season; Slot himself.