This commentary originally appeared on The Wire China on January 19, 2025.
Donald Trump's second inauguration as U.S. president this week is likely to dominate global headlines. But anyone watching China's recent policy moves should be wary of seeing everything through the Trump lens.
Take the recent round of tit-for-tat export controls between Washington and Beijing. After the U.S. government imposed additional restrictions on exports to China of hardware and software used to manufacture semiconductors early in December, the Chinese authorities responded within 24 hours by banning exports to the United States of a range of minerals including gallium, germanium, antimony, and superhard materials vital in a range of industries including electronics manufacturing.
The speed of Beijing's response was notable. Two years earlier, it had taken the Chinese government more than six months to adopt a new, targeted export licensing regime for gallium and germanium following the United States' introduction of export controls on advanced semiconductors in October 2022.
Some commentators have drawn both direct and indirect connections between China's increased assertiveness in its use of export controls and other measures as preparation for Trump's return to the White House. For sure, China is gearing up for the next U.S. presidency -- but its actions are not just about that.
China's "assertiveness" in December was likely motivated by three alternative factors. First, Beijing views these actions as part of enduring tensions with the United States, irrespective of who occupies the White House. Second, the new export controls were adopted primarily as a direct response to the similar U.S. measures implemented by the Biden administration, rather than the incoming Trump-led government.
Third, in recent years, China has pursued policies that largely mirror U.S. policies. December's announcements illustrate that China continues to learn from the U.S. playbook and has mastered the adoption of policies as instruments of statecraft -- an approach also referred to as "lawfare."
Another set of recent measures illustrate the way China's tactics are evolving. China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) in January announced its intention to impose new export controls () on technologies used in battery components and in the processing of raw minerals -- two sectors where China maintains a distinct advantage () in global supply chains. China processes more than 90 percent of certain critical minerals, owns more than 80 percent of battery cell production, and manufactures over 90 percent of anodes and cathodes globally.
In the past, China has typically selected areas of its economy for restrictions where the costs to itself are small. However, battery manufacturing and critical minerals processing are important elements of China's economy led by Chinese companies, meaning these restrictions could entail higher costs for China itself -- a risk it has previously avoided when imposing costs on others.
Still, China's appetite for self-inflicted costs should not be re-estimated too quickly. A quick look at the list () of items for the proposed new export controls shows that Beijing is targeting narrowly selected items that are already under increased scrutiny and restrictions by third countries. With the newly proposed export controls, China may be seeking to regain control over a dynamic that currently sees the country on the receiving end of restrictive measures. Both the European Union and the United States, to different degrees, have imposed restrictions on imports of EVs.
Additionally, we should not forget that the new export controls have not been adopted yet and are currently open for public consultation. China may still be assessing the costs to its own companies. Finally, as in the past, should new licences be adopted, it does not mean that exports would be immediately restricted or banned -- but that China is increasing the number of levers it has ready to be used if needed.
All in all, signalling still plays a central role in the way China uses restrictions. For instance, the new restrictions announced on January 2, 2025 against U.S. companies appear to target firms with little business presence in, or engagement with, China.
Another recent development cited as evidence of China preparing for a new U.S. administration is the economic stimulus packages it announced through the autumn. But rather than being a response to Trump's return, and the possible imposition of 60 percent tariffs on imports from China, the stimulus appears to be more about following on from the fiscal and monetary measures taken by Beijing in 2023.
The Central Economic Work Conference in December 2024 meanwhile highlighted the importance of domestic demand as a driver of economic growth. This emphasis on consumption and measures to boost it are a combination of concerns over the hostile external environment -- to which Trump may contribute but which has long been a fixed point of China's perception -- and the internal performance of the economy.
Boosting demand and revitalising the domestic economy have consistently been a high priority for China since the COVID pandemic, particularly after 2022. In other words, the significance of the home market in boosting China's economic resilience, and to its stimulus efforts, predates the probability of a second Trump presidency. It is not clear that the forthcoming change of administration has injected any further urgency on the part of Beijing.
Indeed Trump or no Trump, China has long been assessing and attempting to minimize its vulnerabilities -- particularly in relation to the United States -- while exploiting those of its competitors. Over the four years of the Biden administration, China has adopted an increasing number of policies that mirror the U.S. policy framework. To interpret China's current actions as a change of gear aimed specifically at the next Trump presidency disregards the evolution of Chinese policymaking and implementation over recent years. The decisions of recent weeks reflect an approach informed by the belief that, regardless of changes in the American administration, China's perception is that it is locked in a strategic contest with the world's preeminent power.
While these same policies may serve as bargaining chips in potential future negotiations, interpreting them solely as tactical measures to prepare for a second Trump presidency risks policy and strategic miscalculations. Not everything China does will be about Trump: Most of it will be first and foremost about China.