The idea of writing a series of articles packed with photos of pillboxes and other field defences has always been on my mind. My aim is to record as many of the remaining pillboxes as possible and raise awareness about them among the public.
This series started with three features about the pillboxes and other field defences of Mellieħa. Others focused on Mġarr, Mosta, Naxxar and St Paul's Bay.
This sixth feature is about those found in Birżebbuġa.
Although the first building programme of pillboxes and other field defences in Malta began in 1935, when Italy invaded Abyssinia, the programme really started in earnest around August 1938.
Land began to be purchased from civilians or ceded by the government to the War Department for the building of pillboxes, beach-posts, depth-posts and other types of defences, mostly by the Royal Engineers.
Meanwhile, as a result of the growing threat of war, after the occupation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, the previous type of pillboxes was discarded as building this type was considered too time-consuming.
The stone cladding camouflage and curved fronts were abandoned and simple, box-like structures were introduced. The Royal Engineers built most of these new pillboxes inland and some of them still exist.
Three main types were built: those that were painted were camouflaged to look-like rubble walls or even painted to appear as rural farmhouses, complete with doors and windows. Nearly all of them had four rectangular machine-gun portholes in the four corners of the structure.
They also had an observation turret either in the middle of the pillbox roof or on the front; the latter generally consisted of a high-rise turret. The observation cupola was reached by a ladder. In the middle of each wall there were two rifle loopholes, with an entrance hatch at the rear.
Although the first air raids on Malta began on June 11, 1940, the building of pillboxes continued till the siege of the island was effectively lifted in mid-1942.
On October 4, 1938, the War Department showed interest in purchasing two plots of land for defence purposes, one situated in St George's Bay (BZ. 1) and another in Birżebbuġa Bay (BZ. 3).
Chief engineer Colonel R.G.R Hunter from the War Department requested the civil government to give it permission, as soon as possible, to enter the two sites in order to prepare the valuation reports and notarial deeds.
It seems, however, that the civil government asked for an excessive sum of money. The cost of the plots of lands was listed as £355 per tumolo for plot BZ. 1 and £213 per tumolo for plot BZ. 3. Colonel Hunter saw these valuations as excessive, especially when considering that the very best agricultural land did not cost more than in the range of £60 to £65 per tumolo. He asked the secretary to the government to reconsider the valuation of the plots.
By late October, Hunter was informed by the lieutenant-governor that there was no objection to the purchase of the sites BZ. 1 and BZ. 3. The prices were changed to £137.15.7 for BZ. 1, and £30.10 for BZ. 3. The Royal Engineers were given the go-ahead to start works on these two sites.
A particular proposal for the transfer of a plot of land, L. 35, seems to have lingered without resolution for a considerable period before a final agreement was reached - according to correspondence, it lasted until at least summer 1942. However, it is interesting how a proposed notarial deed on this plot, dated around November 1941, reveals how agreements were made between the owners of land and the War Department.
This particular land seems to have been in the hands of two people from different backgrounds. Notaries had to appear for the original owners. Dr Joseph Pace, appeared in the deed as attorney of chemist Olga Costantino; Edgar Staines appeared as custodian of enemy property representing Carmela Spiteri (daughter of the late Salvatore Costantino Magri), born and residing in Tunis (Vichy French Tunisia); and Dr Joseph Salomone was attorney of Giacomo Magri, who resided in Australia.
As already mentioned, this particular notarial deed was about the selling and transfer of plot L. 35 by Pace and Salomone, referred to as "ne" and "nomine" in the contract, and Colonel Eaton-Matthews "nomine", representing the War Department, who accepted and purchased the land.
This plot of land formed part of a holding known as Tal-Mandra tal-Wied. The same plan had a superficial area of 8.8 misure and was bound from all directions by the remaining property of the same vendors.
If we observe the modern limits of Birżebbuġa on a wartime map of Malta, there were at least 10 pillboxes and other field defences: BZ. 2 (St George's Bay), L. 30 and L. 31 (Il-Fiddien), L. 32 and L. 33 (Għar Dalam), L. 34 (Borġ in-Nadur), L. 38 (Bengħajsa), R. 30 (Dahar il-Ħmar), R. 31 (Wied il-Kol) and R. 32 (Wied il-Qoton). A number of these pillboxes formed part of three successive defensive lines, which also consisted of depth-posts and reserve-posts.
The 2nd Battalion, The Devonshire Regiment was responsible for the defence of Birżebbuġa. Men from this battalion manned all the pillboxes situated in this village and also the Ħal Far aerodrome. The Devons were also responsible for the nearby villages, including Għaxaq, parts of Marsaxlokk, Bir id-Deheb and parts of Żejtun.
The 2nd Battalion, The Devonshire Regiment formed part of the Southern Infantry Brigade (SIB), under the command of Brigadier L H Cox. This brigade also included the 1st Battalion, The Hampshire Regiment, 1st Battalion, The Dorsetshire Regiment and the 3rd Battalion, the King's Own Malta Regiment. In 1943, it became known as the 231 Infantry Brigade - assigned to the Southern Sector under HQ Southern Infantry Brigade at Luqa.
Fort Bengħajsa in Birżebbuġa was at that time still armed with the obsolete 9.2-inch BL Mk. X coastal guns, which were intended to defend the approaches to Marsaxlokk Bay. These were also in a position to defend the Kalafrana seaplane base. There were also four 18-pdr field guns defending the south of Birżebbuġa. Two of the 18-pdrs, known with the code XDN 7, were manned by the 13th Battery of the Royal Malta Artillery (RMA). They were positioned to defend the approaches to Kalafrana seaplane base.
There were also two old 6-pdrs and two Italian captured Breda 47mm anti-tank guns.
Meanwhile, the Italian naval authorities were preparing to invade Malta. The Italian authorities knew every detail of the Maltese islands - this was helped in no small way by air photography (and probably those Maltese who remained in Italy helped them too).
In his book Operazione C3: Malta, Mariano Gabriele included in the appendices a resumé of a reunion, dated March 6, 1942, which included studies made by Admiral Tur, General Sogno, Comando Supremo Italiano of Italy and a group of Japanese experts. It must be said that the latter had already vast experience of seaborne invasions and successful landings in the Far East against Allied colonies, carried out between December 1941 and March 1942.
By mid-April 1942, the Germans had begun to take a more practical interest and a joint German-Italian Staff was set up. New plans jostled one another but certain, strong agreements were gradually reached.
The Italians, in conjunction with the Germans, knew how much they needed to bombard the Maltese islands to soften the military installations. By May, the definite invasion plan was established by the Regio Ezercito (Italian Royal Army), Regia Marina, (Italian Royal Navy) and Regia Aeronautica (Italian Royal Air Force), together with the Germans.
According to the final version of the Axis invasion plan of Malta, known to them as Operazione C.3/Operation Herkules, the main aim was to take hold of the south of the island.
Marsaxlokk Bay was codenamed Zone Larnaca. There were to be glider landings on the southwestern side of Marsaxlokk Bay to neutralise the coastal defences at Kalafrana and Fort Bengħajsa. The sea landing was to consist of an attack on the spit of land west of Marsaxlokk Bay during the night (x-day - x+1-day).
Heavy and other tanks were to land with the tactically necessary accompanying troops west of Marsaxlokk Bay, roughly on both sides of the strip from Bengħajsa Point to Wied ix-Xaqqa. Cargo gliders had then to land with shock troops to neutralise the coastal defences. Next was to be a landing with simultaneous smoke-screening and artillery fire on all fixed defences north and east of Marsaxlokk Bay.
The sea landings and the cargo gliders were to create a bridgehead for the swift employment of tanks and other heavy weapons, thus gaining a point of departure for the early and complete occupation of Marsaxlokk Bay, an important harbour for reinforcements.
Charles Debono is a senior researcher at the National War Museum.
The author would like to thank Michael Balzia, Ryan Vella and the staff of the National Archives at Rabat, Malta, for their continuous assistance.