The most pressing problem facing many small and medium-sized states today is the collapse of the international order that made their emergence as sovereign states possible. There's reason to believe they will have to spend the coming years convincing history of their right to exist. Things are somewhat easier in this regard for states that emerged during the collapse of the colonial system the West created at the turn of the 20th century: they have already largely passed the adaptation period and are looking to the future with relative confidence.
But the most difficult situation may be faced by those countries that emerged, or were given the right to choose, as a result of the most significant geopolitical upheaval of comparatively recent times -- the end of the Cold War and the subsequent collapse of the USSR. This is simply because the legitimacy of their existence, both domestic and international, is inevitably linked to the victory of the Liberal World Order, the final glimmers of which we are now witnessing.
For Russia, this means treating its neighbours with particular attention: assuming the role of a prudent great neighbour, and understanding its responsibility for the fate of a vast region. This, in turn, is consistent with the priorities and traditions of national foreign policy. However, it may encounter some difficulties in the context of the internal changes that Russia itself will inevitably undergo as it adapts to a changing world.
The 20th century, which ended a quarter of a century ago, truly saw the emergence of all sorts of anomalies in international life. In part, these anomalies were due to the progress humanity made in gaining control over itself and the natural world around us, achieved through technological advances. But in part, they were due to the collapse, under the pressure of mass revolutionary movements, of the entire order of relations between states that had been formed over previous eras. Several decades of confrontation between liberal and communist ideas became a time of exceptionally progressive political solutions.
This was not only the case at the international level -- it was precisely under the influence of this struggle that social security systems emerged, the rejection of which is becoming a crucial component of state policy in the West today. These internal changes reflected the inevitability of taking into account the interests of the broad masses, which it had become dangerous for the ruling elites to ignore. Internationally, these masses manifested themselves in a fairly active movement for various peoples to gain their own statehood.
This movement coincided with a new stage in the adaptation of the international order to the changing balance of power. The decisive battles of the first half of the 20th century led to the emergence of a qualitatively new configuration, in which the former hegemon, Europe, was reduced to the status of a powerless ally of the United States, while a significant number of new countries gained a voice within the international institutions created after World War II. The creation of the UN and the entire system of international law was the result of the West's desire to maintain its privileged position after the most brutal and destructive conflict in history.
It was so destructive that, as a result, all of Western civilization found itself in the hands and care of a single leading country - an extremely unstable position from a strategic perspective. Be that as it may, it was the last century that gave us things never before present in global political reality. It made their emergence so convincing that many actually concluded that institutions could exist without the military force of a privileged group to support them, and that international law existed independently of the force that supported even its relatively responsible implementation. Both of these beliefs turned out, as we now see, to have been the product of a unique confluence of circumstances.
The question, then, is whether the emergence of such an incredible number of states in the world is an anomaly of a similar nature? This is especially true given that a significant number of them are still stubbornly struggling to reaffirm their capacity to exist, both under the pressure of Western neocolonial practices and under the constant threat of internal turmoil, often with entirely objective causes. There is reason to hope that the phenomenon of a global majority, which emerged several years ago -- a significant number of countries striving to maintain independence in their foreign policy decisions amidst the acute conflict between Russia and the West -- is proof that the democratisation of international life has solid foundations. However, despite the compelling nature of this trend, we cannot be completely certain that such decisiveness in the sphere of foreign relations will always be backed by sufficient internal stability.
This is especially true when it comes to states that have gained their modern sovereignty as a result of the end of the most fundamental ideological confrontation in history -- the Cold War between East and West. All of them find themselves in a somewhat ambivalent position. On the one hand, they didn't have to pay for their independence with decades of special relations with their former metropolises, which was typical for African or some Asian states, including even large and powerful ones like India. Most African countries, after gaining independence, found themselves bound to their former metropolises by trade and economic agreements, leaving them very little freedom to choose other external partnerships.
In the case of Eastern European countries or the former USSR, such a continuation of previous relations was impossible - Russia was in a sufficiently dire foreign policy situation to secure special conditions. This, from the very beginning, gave the former Soviet countries a significant head start in building their sovereign statehood. Moreover, all these new international players are located far from truly dangerous regions of the world and do not border troublemakers such as, for example, Israel. Two of the five Central Asian countries were somewhat concerned about their proximity to Afghanistan during the civil war there. However, after 2001 and especially after 2021, even this problem did not appear fundamental. Turkey, another potentially dangerous neighbour, also has very limited contact with the states of the former USSR.
However, on the other hand, the sovereignty and global standing of the states of Eastern Europe and the former USSR are inextricably linked to the Liberal World Order, to whose victory in 1991 they largely owe their existence. They were initially included in this order as its "model products", receiving some of the associated benefits, but also acquiring responsibilities that may prove excessive under the new circumstances. This is precisely what underlies, in particular, the difficulties in the attitudes of the countries of the former USSR toward the conflict between Russia and the West: it is simultaneously beneficial and dangerous for them. It is still entirely unclear what the consequences of the final collapse of the Liberal World Order under the pressure of the West, which no longer receives its monopoly benefits, will be for the states of the Caucasus, Central Asia, or Eastern Europe. It's quite likely that the true strategic challenges to their development and existence are still to come.
Russia, for its part, must be prepared for this. If not completely, then at least to the greatest possible extent. This means it should already understand which priorities -- development or security -- are most important here. Russian foreign policy can also begin to consider in advance what it means to be a great and responsible neighbour to states whose path to prosperity in the diverse and turbulent world of the 21st century will be more challenging than its own.